

## COBBETT'S WEEKLY POLITICAL REGISTER.

VOL. XVIII. No. 7.] LONDON, SATURDAY, AUGUST 25, 1810. [Price 1s.

"The ARMY, against whom this Libel is in a peculiar manner directed, calls on the Court for justice against its seducer."—ATTORNEY GENERAL'S Speech, Thursday, 5th July, 1810.

[225]

[226]

## SUMMARY OF POLITICS.

DUKE OF YORK.—For some days past, there has been in the town a sort of *babble* respecting an *Address*, which, it was said, was handing about, from regiment to regiment, for signatures, the object of which *Address* was to cause the Duke of York to be *restored to his office of Commander in Chief*. The *Address*, as published in the *COURIER* news-paper of the 22nd instant, was as follows. — "To THE ARMY.—The auspicious hour has arrived, that enables the friends of truth to justly appreciate the injuries and oppression that have been heaped upon the character of his Royal Highness the Duke of York. The base and unprecedented secret motives, so unsuccessfully practised, to degrade his Royal Highness, and also to destroy the happiness and repose of the Royal Family, are now completely developed! by the late trials and publications that have succeeded: events that are disgraceful to the annals of Britain! and must reflect an odium upon the age that has tolerated proceedings that will ever be recollect with contemptuous pity and regret!!! — When we reflect what must have been the sufferings of an aged and excellent Monarch, in experiencing a diminution of his family's dignity—by the disaffected and mercenary proceedings of a party, who had neither principle, truth, or honour, for their support; we are amazed that noble characteristic of Englishmen should have been subverted by the intrigue of faction. — We must at this moment sincerely regret the hasty, yet dignified resignation of the Duke of York, which we are now sensible, did not proceed from a self conviction of error, but from a disposition to comply with the public mind, which was at that period led away by the torrent of prejudice, then most nefariously raised against his Royal Highness.—From a thorough conviction of the injuries his Royal Highness has suffered in his character and re-

putation, we anticipate the wishes of the military, in the restoration of his Royal Highness to that situation his conduct so dignified, evinced in the regulations, and benevolence he most liberally and impartially extended to all ranks in the army.—The army is, therefore, requested to afford their signature to a Petition, intended to be presented to the King's Most Excellent Majesty, to humbly intreat his Majesty will be graciously pleased to restore his Royal Highness Frederick Duke of York, to the office of Commander in Chief, &c. &c.— Books for the signatures of those Officers, who are disposed to subscribe to the above Petition, are now opened at, &c." — Now, as to what this *Address* says about the *base means used against the Duke of York*, it will pass for nothing as long as the two *Darling Letters* remain, and indeed as long as the proceedings of 1809 are in existence. However, this is not the subject now to be considered. Nor do I, for my part, think that it signifies one straw, whether the Duke of York be restored or not. To put him out of his place was an object not worth an hour of the time of any man above the rank of a common day-labourer; and very stupid indeed must those be, who supposed that Mr. Wardle's undertaking was directed to this point. For my own part, I have declared over and over again, that I would not have taken my right leg and thrown it across my left knee for the sake of ousting him from his place. There was, and there is, to me nothing that I can form an idea of more indifferent than whether he be or be not Commander in Chief. Whether the fly that is now moving about upon my paper be a male or a female is a matter of full as much importance in my sight as whether the Duke of York or Sir David Dundas be Commander in Chief.—But, as to this *Address* to the ARMY to sign a petition, calling upon the King to restore the Duke of York, that is a matter worthy of something in the way of observation, especially considering the manner, in which it has

been spoken of by the news-papers, those of the ministerial side not excepted.— The COURIER of the 22nd, has these remarks upon the subject.—“ We have “ inserted in our last page the Address to “ which we alluded yesterday, purporting “ to be an Address to the Army relative to “ the restoration of the Duke of York as “ Commander in Chief. We had pre- “ pared some remarks upon it. But we “ understand that the Address has been “ disavowed; and a Morning Paper asserts “ that his Royal Highness *has expressed* “ *his indignation* at this pretended *inter-ference of the army*, which has given seri- “ ous offence to many military Officers “ of high rank, and that *measures are now* “ *taking to detect* the person or persons “ with whom this application originated, “ in order to adopt measures to bring the “ parties to punishment.”—The idea of “ an Army constituting itself a delibe- “ rative body, cannot be *too deeply re- probated* as the most unconstitutional “ and most hostile to our FREEDOM that “ could possibly be entertained.”— But, if this be true, what are we to think of the Attorney General’s positive declaration, made to the face of the Judges, that the ARMY called upon them for justice *against me*? It, surely, cannot be worse for the army to interfere in military than in *civil* matters. It, surely, cannot be worse for them to call for the promotion of a superior officer, than for them to call upon the Judges to inflict punishment to *avenge* them. And, after reading in the news-papers, that the Judges had been told to their teeth, that the *army called upon them to do thus or thus*, was it at all wonderful if they thought themselves at liberty to call upon the king to promote his son? And yet the COURIER, who said not a word about the speech of the Attorney General, has now discovered, that it is “ most unconstitutional and most hostile “ to our *freedom*,” for the army to consti- tute itself a deliberative body. Why was not this remark made, when, in the court of King’s Bench, the Judges were told, that *the army called upon them to punish its traducer?* “ *Unconstitutional*,” indeed! “ *Hostile to our freedom!*” And, does the man who writes and sells this, think that any living creature is to be deceived by it? Does he think that even those who believe that a man can add to his money by taking it out of one pocket and putting it into the other, are to be, now-a-days, deceived by this? If he does, I really

pity him. There is not a mad-house in the three kingdoms that contains any poor soul ideot enough to be any longer imposed upon by such cant.

HOLLAND.—So many things, nearer home, or, at least, of more pressing interest, have, of late, offered themselves, that I have been induced to postpone the ob- servations, that I intended to make upon the late change in Holland, by which the Emperor Napoleon has taken that country wholly into his own hands, or, in other words, has in name as well as in fact, united it to France.—A great deal has been written, in the English prints, upon this change; but, the writers have confined themselves almost wholly to the taking of such views of the matter as men might be expected to take, who were excessively angry with Napoleon. But, it appears to me, that we should bestow our time, as far as is connected with this subject, in con- sidering whether the change recently made in Holland will affect us; and, if it be like- ly to do so, *how it will affect us.*—Never- theless, as being matter of *history*, we ought not to omit that part of the subject, with which we may be less directly con- cerned. Let us, then, consider the change, 1st, as a matter between Napoleon and his brother Louis; 2ndly, as a thing affecting the people of Holland; and, 3rdly, as an event affecting England.—As to the first, had I never read any of the English com- mentaries upon the conduct of the Emperor, in this respect, I should have re- garded the change as nothing more than the mere *displacing of an agent*, and taking the care of the thing into the principal’s own hands; for, I never looked upon king Louis as any thing more than the agent, or the servant, of the Emperor; and, if the writers in our public prints ever looked upon him in any other light, they were guilty of most shameful hypocrisy; for, where is the reader, who can fail to bear in mind, that these writers have, ever since Louis was appointed king of Holland, continually insisted, that Holland was a province of France? Where is the reader, who can fail to have this fact fresh in his memory? But, behold! now that the use of a *name* is thrown aside, these writers affect to have looked upon Holland as an *independent kingdom!* Aye; but that is not all. They not only affect to have regarded Holland as an independent king- dom; but, have regarded king Louis as a *very good sort of a king.* Oh! how many

times have these same writers spoken of this same Louis in terms the most harsh and degrading! What abuse have they not heaped upon him! And in what melting strains have they poured forth their tender hearts in pity towards the poor good Dutch, who were wailing the loss of the House of Orange, under the cruel compulsion of submitting to this upstart tyrant of the House of Buonaparté! But, the moment that Napoleon turned this "upstart tyrant" off, the tyrant became a very good king in the eyes of these gentlemen. Whether the letter of Louis (see Register, present Volume, page 150) be genuine or not, I do not pretend to say, though if I were to give my *opinion* I should give it in the negative; but, be that as it may, what ground is there for any one to say that Louis was a good king? What did he ever do for the people of Holland? Why, however, do I ask any question of this sort, when it is notorious, that these writers all of them treated him as the tool in the hands of a more powerful despot; and, that they represented him as being particularly detestable, because his office served to disguise, in some sort, the real tyranny that he was employed to exercise over the poor good Dutchmen, who, up to the hour that it was known, or reported, that Napoleon meant to dethrone his brother, were represented as being in the situation the most deplorable in the world. From that hour, however, Louis became an object of praise with the London prints, who called him "the *honest* and *excellent* Louis;" who styled his Letter "an *affectionate publication*;" who lamented that "he could no longer be of service" to the Dutch; who said that he was unable, by the power of "his *intreaties* to rescue them from the *most horrible of all calamities*, the *quartering of FOREIGN TROOPS in their towns and cities*;" who, in short, from a base instrument of hard-hearted despotism, transformed him, in the twinkling of an eye, into a most just, mild, humane, tender-hearted sovereign, who, rather than oppress his people, the poor good Dutch, or be an instrument in the hands of their oppressor, voluntarily resigned his crown, and was almost, if not quite, ready to resign his life.—All this would be matter for mere laughter, were it not amongst the means, by which this nation has been deceived. This false view of the event is a great deal worse than nothing, because it counteracts, or obstructs, the operation of the common sense of the public; who, if

these writers had been silent, would have seen, in the change in Holland, nothing more than the *turning out of an unfit agent*, or, the *putting an end to an agency*, which it was no longer thought proper to continue; and, they would, according to that opinion, have formed a proper estimate of the power of Napoleon as far as relates to Holland. But, from being told that Louis's Letter is a "most *interesting document*;" from being told about the discoveries made by Louis, in the "*simplicity of his heart*;" that it was the "*constant wish* of Louis to *ameliorate* the lot of the "Dutch;" that he abdicated his throne "rather than be an *instrument in their oppression*;" that Louis, having become a king, "set about performing the duties of "his station *with a sincere desire to fulfil them for the welfare of the people over whom he was placed*;" that he was continually thwarted "in his *praise-worthy career*;" that, in taking up the pen, Louis has "wielded a weapon more terrible to his brother than the sword;" that, though Napoleon had "*fettered the press*, it would be no easy task for him "to preclude the complaints of his brother *from reaching the ears of those over whom he rules*." From being told this (as they were in our papers of the 28th of July) and a great deal more of the same sort, the public mind was led away from the foreright and natural view of the subject, and was induced to entertain hopes, that the change in Holland was calculated to produce some great convulsion favourable to us, because injurious to Napoleon. Thus was the public misled; and, in like manner, have they been misled from the year 1793 to this present hour. It was the grossest of all follies to suppose, that the Emperor had, at any moment, left Holland to be ruled, or made use of, in any other way, than the way that he should point out; that, in short, Holland was any thing, either more or less than a province of France. The Emperor made his brother a *king* in order that he might be in rank above his great generals; but, it was not to be believed, that he would ever, for one moment, put out of his absolute power, the vast resources of a country like Holland, by the means of which he can more annoy us, than by all his other means put together. Louis, it would seem, was seized with notions of *independence*; and he talks, in good set terms, about his affection for *his* people; about injustice; about oppression; about seeing

his capital occupied by foreign troops; about his Queen, and the Prince Royal. This is a little too ludicrous. It is a little too stupid to be authentic. Either, however, he wrote this Letter or he did not. If he did not, why, then, it is a mere imposture all together; and, if he did, I am sure he was too great a fool to be trusted with the government even of the Dutch.

—Such is the light, in which the common sense of Englishmen would have seen the change in Holland, as far as related to Napoleon's conduct towards his brother, if the operation of that common sense had not been obstructed by the combined efforts of our public prints.—Let us now consider the change as *affecting the people of Holland*. And, here, we may first observe, that we have no evidence of the people of Holland *disliking* the change. To hear our public prints, who would not have expected to hear of riots at the Hague and at other places. Nothing of the kind. A report is made to the Emperor upon the state of Holland. This report shews, or, rather, asserts, that Holland ought to be united to France; and, what happens then? Why, a decree is drawn up, and the thing is done. There have been no commotions; there has been no opposition to the execution of this decree; and Napoleon has been to visit Holland with as little ceremony as he would go to visit one of his gardens or parks. There is no reasoning with us any more, then, if we will persist in believing that the poor good Dutch dislike him to such a degree, that each individual would gladly cut his throat.—But, what has he *done* to the Dutch? What measures has he adopted, that they should so hate him? In what way has he made their situation worse by this change? We are told (Morning Chronicle 30th July), that *French troops have been brought into Holland*, while many of the *native troops* have been *sent abroad*.

..... Indeed!—We are told, that about 2,000 officers of police were to be appointed with special powers and authority *to enter, at any time, the dwellings, warehouses, and other buildings* of the people.

..... Indeed!—We are told, that the outraged people submitted to all this with the *greatest patience*..... Indeed!

—So; Napoleon brings *foreign troops* into the country, does he, while he takes care to *send the native troops into foreign countries*? And he authorizes his spies and police-men to *enter peoples' houses*, does he, *at any hour in the night*? And the people

submit to all this with the *greatest patience*, do they? Poor Dutch!—One of our writers seems to have become quite enraged upon the subject; and says (See Times 2nd August) that “he for his part “will never cease from relating the acts “of Buonaparté just as he performs them, “with all the fidelity and precision he is “able, and that, having done so, he will, “aye will he, apply to them such terms “and epithets as they merit; and this he “esteeems to be a duty, which, as a public “journalist, he owes to his country and to “mankind in general.” There is *boldness* for you! There is *liberty of the press*! He is not afraid, this man is not, of attacking Buonaparté by name. That is something like *liberty of the press*.—But, to return, for a moment, to the Dutch: we are told (See Morning Chronicle 31st July) that the people are kept in awe by the *foreign troops*, who take even their food from them, who *help themselves*, at pleasure, to every thing they want; which is, indeed, what might be very reasonably expected. We are further told, that the people are *quite broken down in spirit*; and that they submit most patiently to all that is done by the French.—Now, either this is all true, or it is not; if the latter, there is no more to be said about it; and, if the former, I shall leave the reader to settle the question of whether the Dutch deserve what they get, or not. But, at any rate, it appears very clear to me, that the change in the government can have made *no difference at all* to the Dutch; for, what is it to the people of Holland, who enters their houses and who robs them, so that their houses are entered, and so that they are robbed! What signifies it whether the Robbers, come from the South or the North; what sort of clothes they wear; what sort of language they speak? Just as if the robbery could be the less distressing for being committed by a man in a particular dress. Nothing is so stupid; so despicably stupid, as *partiality* in the choice of Public Robbers. Would you, reader, if robbed upon Hounslow Heath, care one straw what dress the highwayman was clad in, or what country he came from? And, why should the Dutch be affected by any such distinction? They are, it seems, compelled to submit to Public Robbery; and, if it be so, I think it is better to be robbed by the principal than by his deputy.—But the *debt*, the National Debt of Holland, is to be wiped off with a *sponge*; or, two thirds of it are, at



least, so to be disposed of. This may be subject of deep complaint with the few, who own the debt; but, it will be a subject of great joy with the many who pay the interest upon that debt. Our writers, when they were at work upon this part of the subject, and estimating the hatred that this sponging work would infallibly engender against Napoleon, seem to have wholly forgotten the circumstance, that the interest upon the National Debt in Holland was paid by *the Dutch*; and, further, that, whatever might be the justice or injustice of the measure, Napoleon himself got nothing by it; having, by his abolition of two thirds of the debt, merely relieved the great mass of the people from the payment of two thirds of the amount of what they before paid in the way of interest upon the debt. Why, therefore, should the people of Holland hate him on account of this change? To be relieved from such a burden of taxation must be of much more importance to them than the mere name of their ruler, or the insignificant circumstance of dress in the persons who were to enter their dwellings and out-houses at their pleasure. What is it to the Dutchman, whether his food be taken from him by the soldier *in person*, or by *some one else*, who comes and takes it, while the soldier is waiting, with his musket cocked, round the corner of the street? This seems to be the only material change, lately introduced amongst the Dutch by Napoleon; and, I am inclined to think, that the Dutch find it full as well to pay the soldier directly, and in kind, as to be fleeced and sweated and squeezed by an intermediate agency, which, call it by what *name* you will; smooth it over, varnish it, disguise it, do what you like with it, was, at last, neither more nor less than the *power of the musket*.—We hear, from Holland, and from many other countries, of discontents after discontents; but none of them ever break out into action. If what our public prints tell us be true, Napoleon is hated by every soul upon the Continent of Europe. The Dutch hate him, the Spaniards hate him, the Swiss hate him, the Italians hate him, the Germans hate him, the French hate him mortally. All his Generals hate him. Every living creature wishes him dead. But, in the midst of this universal hatred, we see him quitting his capital and his kingdom, for weeks and months together, without any attempts being made against his authority, and we see him in battle

after battle without any hurt to his person. We have had him several times poisoned, or stabbed, and he is yet unhurt.—It is quite astonishing that we should still believe these things. We have gone on believing in this way from the year 1792; and, it really does now seem, that nothing will ever cure us.—Had we not been thus under the influence of a blindness not to be accounted for, our condition would not have been what it now is. We should not have acted upon those false hopes, which, day after day, have only tended to pave the way for our ruin. We have not seen, because we would not see; because we appear to have made a vow not to see, that it was *public opinion*, that it was *a new way of thinking*, in the nations of Europe, and not any thing peculiar to Buonaparté, that was operating the changes in government and dominion. He is a great Soldier and a great Statesman; but, he would have done little, or nothing, without public opinion. *That* has been at work for him every where, and he has merely attended to its invitations.—We allow, indeed, that he has a *faction in Ireland*. It was openly declared in parliament, that there was a *French faction* in Ireland, and a law was passed upon a presumption of the truth of the fact. The Morning Post of the 13th instant says: “Ireland, indeed, DEMANDS ‘AN ARMY, worried and distracted as she is ‘by French conspiracies and machinations.’” Now, how does this agree with all our assertions about a *universal* hatred existing against Napoleon? What a handsome compliment do we, in these assertions, coupled with our declarations regarding Ireland, pay ourselves, or rather our government? We insist, that all the people of all the nations on the continent hate Napoleon; that even the French hate him; and yet that, such is his influence in Ireland, that that country *demands a regular army*. It will not do to shuffle here, and say, that, by *French factions* and *French conspiracies*, we do not mean persons attached to the Emperor Napoleon; because, if that be not our meaning, there is no sense in our words, especially when accompanied with the declaration of the necessity of an army.—One would think that, in this single fact respecting Ireland, there was quite enough to undeceive us as to this belief of Napoleon’s being an object of universal hatred. One would think, that, at any rate, it would set us to reflecting upon the matter; that it would

induce us to make an effort to get rid of the influence of a prejudice so fatal; but, greatly do I fear that neither it nor any thing else ever will, and that we shall still cling to the imposture, by which we have been brought into our present situation.

—The third light, in which I wish the reader to consider the recent change in Holland, namely, *as it may affect England*, does not appear to have been at all thought of by any of our public writers; or, at least, they have not bestowed upon it that attention which it evidently calls for.—

—Till the interior part of the continent was settled, Napoleon could not attend to Holland. He could neither attend to it in person nor could he conveniently spare either the army or the men of talent necessary to give to it its full degree of utility, or, even to put it in motion. He seems to have placed Louis in it for a time, and to have given him the title of *king* for the purpose of amusing, not only the Dutch but the world. But, having settled the interior of the Continent, his next object was, of course, to make use of Holland, that country, which of all others, he must have known, was the most valuable as a means of annoying and injuring England. He might not have originally entertained the design of displacing his brother; but, there can be no doubt of his never having intended to leave this valuable country under the *control* of any one but himself. If, therefore, he found, that Louis was a man, incapable of executing his designs as far as related to Holland; or, that he was puffed up with any notions of independence; or that he was really a man to be softened by the wailings of individual distress, necessary to the effecting of the great warlike projects in view; he would, of course, oust him with very little ceremony. To have supposed the contrary, would have argued a wonderful degree of folly. There has, in the whole of Napoleon's history, appeared a very strong desire to aggrandize his family. His brothers, his mother, his sister, his uncle: he has neglected none of them. He has not turned his back upon any of them. He has brought them all forward. He has done great things for them all and for all those allied to them, in even the most distant degree. We should not, in estimating his views upon the present occasion, overlook this circumstance; because it ought to satisfy us, that, in displacing his brother Louis, he must have been actuated by some powerful mo-

tive. The fact is, that it is very clear, that he would sacrifice much to his family of any thing but his views of dominion; but, that he would, if necessary, sacrifice family or any thing else to those views. I do not mean to the *mere possession of territory*; for, possess, in the true sense of the word, or even *govern*, he cannot, the half of the territory that now owns his sway. His ambition is of a higher order: what he aims at, is, *commanding the world*; levelling old establishments; pulling down whatever opposes him; revolutionizing the world; in the accomplishment of which views he has been most wonderfully aided by most of the old establishments themselves. Indeed he is not so much the leader of an *army* as the *agent of a moral principle*. To do what he has done he must have been a great captain; but, if *arms* alone had aided him, he would at this day have been, at most, the commander of a brigade, and, perhaps, not that. He would, very likely, feel humiliated at the thought, but, it is nevertheless true, that every man, who views with a philosophic eye what is now going on in the world, looks upon Napoleon as nothing more than an unconscious instrument for giving effect to a great pervading principle.—It is not the interest of those who fatten upon corruption to suffer this to be believed, if they can prevent it. It is their interest to make men believe, that Buonaparté has been elevated by *mere accident*; that mere accident may kick him down; and, that, at any rate, all danger would end with his life. But, are not our own declarations regarding Ireland a sufficient answer to this? What can the Irish know *personally* of Buonaparté? What can they care about him personally? No: it is the *principle*, of which he is the agent, and which principle would find another agent if he were gone; just, as in other cases, the *AGENTS* of the principle of *corruption and public robbery*, are supported by the *Robbers* for the sake of the principle, and not for *their own sakes*. The Miscreant of the day is puffed up with the notion, that it is to him personally that the adulation is paid; but, each succeeding Miscreant receives just the same quantity and kind of adulation: the name only is changed; the principle continues the same.—In Holland the mass of the people will, probably, be pleased with the change that has taken place. When we landed in ZEALAND, there was not, that I ever heard of, any of the Dutch, who came to join us;

which does  
been told of  
those count  
ment of Nap  
our wishing  
government  
General Sa  
ago,) the I  
government  
deavouring  
the harm in  
hatred exis  
cause, the  
us slack in  
tion of suc  
our defence  
that he ha  
land, and v  
tion and en  
mediately  
eys, and w  
set to wo  
means of d  
of war pou  
rivers and  
country on  
the seas, c  
country n  
have begu  
sequences,  
with a for  
end of eig  
we might  
sequences  
expedition.  
leon is no  
of an invad  
I think, he  
ration. A  
or a year  
fleet read  
will the c  
especially  
again in a  
at Brest,  
and Lisbo  
us in the  
then laug  
of attack  
but, it is  
the batte  
Vienna, a  
It being  
that we  
we ought  
to the co  
able to d  
ed in ma  
not don  
when th

which does not agree with what we have been told of the hatred, that the people of those countries bear towards the government of Napoleon. There is no harm in our *wishing* the Dutch to hate him and his government any more than there was in General Sarrazin's *wishing*, (some years ago,) the Irish to hate our king and his government: there is no harm in our endeavouring to make all the world hate him: the harm is, in our believing that such hatred exists, when it does not exist; because, the effect of such belief is, to make us slack in our efforts to procure the adoption of such measures as are necessary to our defence against him. When we heard, that he had ousted his brother from Holland, and was directing all his own attention and energy that way, we should immediately have followed him with our eyes, and with our pens. We should have set to work to consider what were our means of defence against a hundred ships of war poured out of the mouths of the rivers and out of the ports of Holland, a country once the rival of England upon the seas, and the naval means of which country nothing can destroy; we should have begun seriously to calculate the consequences, not of a landing in England with a force of fifty thousand men, at the end of eight or ten hours sail, but, surely, we might have begun to calculate the consequences of *known preparations for such an expedition*. It appears to me, that Napoleon is now setting about the preparation of an invading armament in Holland. There, I think, he will make his grandest preparation. And, if, in the course of a year, or a year and a half, he has a numerous fleet ready for sea, with *an army on board*, will the effect here be to make us *laugh*; especially if the Flotilla at Boulogne be again in a state of readiness, while a fleet at Brest, another at Rochfort, at Ferrol, and Lisbon, all with *troops on board*, stare us in the face at the same time? Shall we then *laugh*? Such a combination of means of attack may, perhaps, never be seen; but, it is much less improbable than was the battle of Wagram, the conquest of Vienna, and the last marriage of Napoleon. It being far within the scope of possibility, that we shall behold such a combination, we ought, I think, to be looking forward to the consequences. That we shall be able to defend our country, though attacked in many parts at once, is what I will not doubt of; though I do think, that, when the ministerial writers themselves

declare, that *an army* is necessary to defend Ireland against *French factions and conspiracies*, even now, we ought to reflect a little on what would be wanted in the case contemplated; that is to say, in the case of there being French armies afloat at Rochfort, Brest, Ferrol, and Lisbon. Let me not be interrupted here and abused for counting these two last places amongst the ports of Buonaparté. I am merely supposing what is *possible*. I am aware, that while we have an army of *sixty thousand men* in Portugal, under my Lord Talavera, to whose army the French general's soldiers are deserting by hundreds at a time; I am aware, that, while this is the case, it would, as the Morning Post says, be *dastardly to the last degree*, to entertain any apprehensions for the final safety of Portugal. But, though we can have no such apprehensions, there is a *possibility* of the ports of Ferrol and Lisbon falling under the domination of Napoleon: and, if *they should*, then the case, which, for argument's sake, I have supposed, may happen; and, if *it should happen*, what will be the consequences, not of a *landing* in England, but of a *menace to land*? And, what will be the consequences in *Ireland*, either of an actual landing, or of a menace to land?—If I am asked, now, why I point out these dangers without pointing out the means of prevention, I answer that I am not bound to point out any means of prevention, and for this plain reason, that I may know of none, and yet I have a right to shew, and it may be very useful to shew, that the danger exists, or may very soon exist. The means of prevention that *I should be disposed to point out* might bring me a great deal of abuse, if not *something worse*; and, therefore, I shall, for the present, at least, keep them to myself; but, it does not follow, that I am not to speak of the danger, because, if this principle were to be adopted, no man would be allowed to complain of any evil, for which he had not a remedy. Something very much like this was, indeed, attempted to be urged against Mr. Fox, at the time of the stoppage of cash payments at the Bank, in 1797; but, he replied: “What! “do you call upon me for a remedy, who “have been, for so many years, warning “you against the evil that has now ar- “rived: if there be no remedy, so much “the greater your fault, and no fault at “all of mine.” Still, however, the adherents of Pitt insisted, that it was Mr. Fox’s business to *find a remedy* for the

evil, to *hold his tongue*, and they flew at him, in a pack, open-mouthed; and that, too, at the very moment that the holders of bank notes were slinking back, with empty hands and lopping ears, from Threadneedle Street.—Such may be the case with respect to me and my warnings; but, no abuse of me will mend the matter; no abuse of me will retard either the armaments or the armies of Napoleon, and, I am quite sure, that it will never give me a moment's uneasiness.

**PORTUGAL.**—To be sure, when we look at the present posture of our affairs in this country (where we have an army of *Sixty thousand fighting men*) as described by the Editors of our ministerial prints, there is not much ground for fear of the result of the campaign now going on, and, of course, not much reason to fear, that Napoleon will ever get possession of the ports of Ferrol and Lisbon.—By the COURIER news-paper of the 23d instant, we are informed, that Massena had been outwitted by my Lord Talavera; that the former (great fool!) hoped we should *relieve Rodrigo*; next, that we should *make a stand* at Fort Conception; and, lastly, that we should *risk a battle* for the sake of Almeida; in all which hopes my Lord Talavera had completely disappointed the Frenchman, who, though the favourite of Napoleon, had been out-generalled by my Lord of Talavera.—We had, the same authority informs us, on the 7th instant fairly beat the French at *manoeuvring*. It appears, that the enemy made a movement forward, with a view of what is called "*turning*" us, and evidently would have brought up a large force for the purpose; but that my Lord Talavera, "with great judgment and "promptitude, foresaw his project, and "disappointed it by *throwing back his flank* "and placing the winding Mondego be- "tween him and the enemy." This, it would seem, made the enemy *retreat* with all possible speed.—In another part of the same print, we are informed, that, if a general battle should take place, it will *end in our favour*; that the conquest of Lisbon is no easy task; that the British army is in high spirits and abundantly supplied; that nearly a whole regiment of Swiss Soldiers, with most of their officers, amounting to about 700 men, had deserted to our army, and that Massena was so distrustful of any troops but French and Italians, that he took care that

the others should *very seldom* come within sight of the British colours; and, finally, that our Portuguese allies had uniformly conducted themselves *very gallantly*.

—This being the state of our army in Portugal, there can be very little apprehension entertained, as to the result.—The Morning Post, indeed, of this day (Friday) has an assertion, which, were it to be believed, would form a sort of drawback from this most consoling and heart-cheering intelligence. It is this:—

"GENERAL BERESFORD has lately issued a "number of General Orders to the Portuguese army under his command, by "which, it appears, that several hundreds "of the peasants have *deserted their stan- "dard*, and fled, not to the enemy, but to "their homes. Several of them have "been apprehended and *punished*, the "General having with him Magistrates "duly appointed for that purpose, and "others have been *sent to work the mines*."

—What! Is this Field Marshal Beresford? But, surely, these *deserting* people cannot be any part of the Portuguese army, "who have uniformly conducted themselves *so gallantly*?" They cannot belong to "our Portuguese companions in arms and in glory?" No, no: upon looking at the paragraph again, I see, that they were "*peasants*." I really began to fear, that they composed part of the *thirty thousand* allies that we, the people of this country, are paying. It would, indeed, have been a shocking disappointment to find, that, just when the French began to come near them, they, our allies, whom we are paying, should set off to their homes; should *desert* their standard, should require to be *punished*, and, some of them to be *condemned to the mines*.—During the two last weeks this same print assured us, that the Portuguese soldiers behaved *admirably* and that the people of Portugal were *hearty* in the cause and *strenuous* in their exertions. It must, then, be an abominable slander to hint, that the Portuguese army; that any portion of our thirty thousand men, have gone away, slunk off home, actually turned tail, at the first approach of the enemy.—

No, no: hushed be our fears upon this score. We have, and we *know it well*, an army of **SIXTY THOUSAND MEN** in our **PAY** in Portugal, and we know that Mr. Vilhers assured us, that none were paid of the Portuguese who did not make their corporeal appearance; and, therefore, let us believe none of these stories,

which see that our French, is seen, we Massena many besiderable time, been to such "section the comm no: we v rate, let u some of others co part of t that we p may be t been thus tion in te and peasan There mu that Port nished, on view of i in defend may be ; lieve, and has been part of th are payin exception look upon THOUS odd, tha the numbe intellig are told place ; are give upon thi importan am very MASSEN shall we him, unl priority during t we had Portuga "streng "tious "quale "larly get on; the cou the peop and stri being t

which seem calculated to make us believe, that *our army*, instead of that of the French, is wasting away.—We have seen, week after week, that *the army of Massena is deserting*. Poles, Swiss, and many besides, to a total amount of a considerable army. We have, at the same time, been told of the fidelity and gallantry of our allies. And, shall we now listen to such stories as this about the “desertion from the *Portuguese army*” under the command of Marshal Beresford? Oh! no: we will not believe this: or, at any rate, let us not believe, that the deserters, some of whom have been *punished*, and others *condemned to the mines*, make any part of the thirty thousand Portuguese that we pay: let us never believe this. It may be that Portuguese “peasants” have been thus treated. Here is a contradiction in terms: they are called the *army* and *peasants* in one and the same sentence. There must be some mistake. It may be that Portuguese peasants have been *punished*, or *condemned to the mines*, with a view of inducing them, or others, to fight in defence of their native country; this may be; but, nothing shall make me believe, and I never will believe, that this has been the case with respect to any part of the thirty thousand men whom we are paying in Portugal, where, with the exception of the deaths of the year, I still look upon us as having an army of SIXTY THOUSAND fighting men.—It is very odd, that we are still in the dark as to the numbers of the French army. We have intelligence of all sorts except this. We are told about every movement that takes place; the most exact and minute details are given us, as to all other points; but, upon this point, yielding to no other in importance, we never hear one word. I am very anxious to know the numbers of MASSENA; because, after all, what glory shall we and our allies gain in beating him, unless it appears, that he has a superiority of numbers? The Morning Post, during the week before last, stated, that we had complete military possession of Portugal, and that, “besides the natural strength of the country, there were various fortified places, which were adequately garrisoned, and must be regularly besieged” before the enemy could get on; further, that all the resources of the country were in our hands; and, that the people were all hearty in the cause and strenuous in their exertions. This being the case, what have we to fear; and

especially from an enemy like the French, who is “so execrated in Portugal,” and who has been in Portugal before; now, who is now bringing along with him, that very Tartar, Junot, who was caught in Portugal before? It were a jest indeed that the Portuguese army should desert from Marshal Beresford under such circumstances!

INDIAN ARMY.—It is not often, that I think it worth while to meddle with any thing belonging to “our Empire in the East,” nor would it be very consistent for me to do so, considering what my opinions are with respect to the utility of that famous “empire;” but, there is a paper, which has been published in some of our public prints, and especially in the COURIER of the 22d instant, which seems to require particular notice.—It purports to be a letter written to one of our governors in India by the Commander of a Division of the army of the East India Company, on the 21st of July, 1809. Its contents are so interesting, that I think it right to place them here immediately under the eye of the reader; and, I am the more disposed to make this an object of general observation, because I have not yet seen any public print that has made a single remark upon it.—“To LIEUTENANT COLONEL BARCLAY, MILITARY SECRETARY TO THE HON. THE GOVERNOR.—Trinchinopoly, July 21, 1809.—Sir; “On a further consideration of your letter of the 14th inst. I think it necessary for the information of the Hon. the Governor, to enter more fully into a detail of the state of the native troops under my command, with a view to the measures most likely to prevent the evils that must ensue from the present seditious state of the European officers. Upon a general view of the European officers of the corps, taken from a constant close attention to their own manner and opinions, and from various reports I have heard at different times, directly and indirectly, I believe that most, if not the whole of the European officers hold opinions that are incompatible with the subordination necessary to make an army useful to its country. The sentiments that I alluded to are, the conceiving themselves labouring under grievances, and uniformly avowing their right to claim and enforce from Government a redress of them, according to the temper, pursuits, and circumstances of the different officers, as

"they are more or less inclined to desperate measures; many of them, being ruined in their fortunes, would be willing to undertake any thing that might probably produce a change. Although I do not think that any native corps will risk any opposition to Government when in garrison with a King's regiment, yet I should much question their conduct if removed to any distance by themselves; and I am fully of opinion, if in any case they were called upon to act against each other, they would instantly become non-efficient.—Having an army of officers so generally disaffected, you will observe that my conclusions are guided much by the information contained in your letter of the 14th inst. However well inclined the sepoy may be at present (and which I believe him to be most perfectly), it must follow by the means of misrepresentations and promises, which officers always have the means of making to the soldier, that the whole of the native troops must, sooner or later, become a seditious army and hostile to government. Such appearing to be the present situation of the Company's troops, in order to avoid the calamity of a civil war, I beg leave to offer my opinion, that stronger measures ought to be pursued, instead of those that have hitherto been adopted, no less than a reform of the native troops appearing to be necessary. There seems to be only one mode that will answer that purpose, besides that of its entire reduction, which is that of removing the whole of the European officers from the native corps. It is an undertaking certainly unprecedented, and at first view may be thought difficult to be accomplished. I am, notwithstanding, convinced that, with secrecy, proper arrangement, and a simultaneous movement, the most of the native troops in the Carnatic may be changed in one day, from a seditious to a loyal army. I have the honour to be, &c. W. WILKINSON, Colonel Commanding S. Division."—One would almost suppose this to be a forgery. Not on account of its contents, but on account of its publication.—If, however, it be authentic, what a state must the "Empire" be in? What should we think of Napoleon's empire, if one of his commanders were to make such a report? This is the way to judge of the effect that such news as this will produce in the world. What would our public prints have said,

if such a paper had been written by one of the French Commanders in Spain or Italy or Holland?—I do not, however, wish to represent this as a matter to excite alarm amongst the people of this kingdom; for I am quite of MR. SPENCE's opinion, that the nation would be more powerful and safe without India than with India; but, if there be persons who think differently, it is, I think, time for them to look about them; for, if this letter do not contain intelligence alarming to them, I do not know what can alarm them.—Government purely military may, for a time at least, be strong and firm; but, to a government, where there is any mixture of civil rights tolerated, a vast military force must finally be dangerous. The officers, serving in India, have, I dare say, carried out with them, those opinions that are incompatible with the subordination necessary to make an army useful to its "country" in the sense in which MR. WILKINSON takes the word useful; and, how are those principles to be got out of them? It is very likely, indeed, that their opinions are not compatible with the subordination necessary in India; but, what will be gained by displacing them? That is the question.—With such scanty information before us, we cannot form any very correct judgment upon the subject; but, if the letter be really what it purports to be, the intelligence from India must very soon be of an important nature.

MR. A. O'CONNOR.—The following paragraph has appeared in all the London prints.—"The following is the extract of a letter from Arthur O'Connor, dated from his farm about 18 miles from Paris, the 13th July, 1810.—' You did me but justice in contradicting that I ever had the smallest connection or hand in any Newspaper in this Country. They little know my feelings who think I could ever meddle in such things in these times. Neither my head, hand or heart have been engaged by such affairs for many years; and since I left Scotland scarce have I written a line for any Newspaper, nor have I had the most distant connection with any: of this be assured!'"—I insert this without any knowledge at all of the fact. The reader will recollect, that, last week, I inserted the FAREWELL OF THE ARGUS, and supposed this gentleman to have been the Editor of that celebrated Journal. It would not be at all surprising,

if all that for years fore, belief wholly O'Connor the ends to assert, made the and, I sh they then lished tr that I ful this " ex see any the public of talent, no man; of them t hostile to to annoy lished un year 180 the truth true, tha thor of th governing thought great abi midable strength his stater be answe

BULLION upon the I have do will not l or in an can read the whol Money.

State Pri 24

N. B. letters in REGISTE cessary present; have th without 15th of S

PORTUGA Navi and

if all that we have been told, day after day, for years past, and which we have, therefore, believed, upon this subject, were wholly false. It was known, that Mr. O'Connor was at Paris; and, as it suited the ends of those, who made the assertion, to assert, that he wrote the *Argus*, they made the assertion without any ceremony; and, I should not at all wonder, if, at last, they themselves believed it to be an established truth.—I cannot say, however, that I fully believe in the authenticity of this “*extract of a letter*;” for, I do not see any motive either for the writing or the publishing of it, seeing that, in point of *talent*, the *Argus* would have disgraced no man; while, as to its sentiments, none of them that I have ever seen were more hostile to this government, nor calculated to annoy it more, than the pamphlet, published under Mr. O'Connor's name, in the year 1804.—It is, however, right that the *truth* should be known; and, if it be true, that Mr. O'Connor was not the author of the *Argus*, it only appears, that our government has one more enemy than we thought for, and that, too, an enemy of great ability; an enemy much more formidable than an army of moderate strength; an enemy, so situated, that his statements and his reasonings are to be answered only by the press.

**BULLION REPORT.**—I next week enter upon the discussion of this subject, before I have done with which, I trust that there will not be many persons in this country, or in any other country, where people can read, who will not clearly understand the whole science and mystery of Paper-Money.

W. COBBETT.

*State Prison, Newgate, Friday,*

*24th August, 1810.*

N. B. In consequence of numerous letters inquiring, whether *broken sets* of the *REGISTER* can be completed, I think it necessary to state here that they may, *at present*; but, that gentlemen who wish to have their sets completed, must apply without loss of time; at least before the 15th of September.

#### OFFICIAL PAPERS.

**PORTUGAL.**—*Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent*

*of Portugal.*—Signed at Rio de Janeiro, the 19th of February, 1810.

In the name of the most Holy and Undivided Trinity.—His Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, being equally animated with the desire not only of consolidating and strengthening the ancient friendship and good understanding which so happily subsist, and have during so many ages subsisted between the two crowns, but also of improving and extending the beneficial effects thereof to the mutual advantage of their respective subjects, have thought that the most efficacious means for obtaining these objects would be, to adopt a liberal system of commerce, founded upon the basis of reciprocity and mutual convenience, which by discontinuing certain prohibitions and prohibitory duties might procure the most solid advantages on both sides, to the national productions and industry, and give due protection at the same time to the public revenue, and to the interests of fair and legal trade. For this end, his Majesty the King of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, have named for their respective Commissioners and Plenipotentiaries, to wit, his Britannic Majesty the most illustrious and most excellent Lord Percy Clinton Sidney, Lord Viscount and Baron of Strangford, one of his Majesty's most Honourable Privy Council, Knight of the Military Order of the Bath, Grand Cross of the Portuguese Order of the Tower and Sword, and his Majesty's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary at the Court of Portugal; and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal the most illustrious and most excellent Lord Dom Rodrigo de Sousa Coutinho, Count of Linhares, Lord of Payalvo, Commander of the Order of Christ, Grand Cross of the Orders of St. Benito and of the Tower and Sword, one of his Royal Highness's Council of State, and his Principal Secretary of State for the Departments of Foreign Affairs and War; who, after having duly exchanged their respective full powers, and having found them in good and due form, have agreed upon the following articles:—ARTICLE I. There shall be a sincere and perpetual friendship between his Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, and between their heirs and suc-

cessors; and there shall be a constant and universal peace and harmony between themselves, their heirs and successors, kingdoms, dominions, provinces, countries, subjects, and vassals, of whatsoever quality or condition they be, without exception of person or place; and the stipulations of this present Article shall, under the favour of Almighty God, be permanent and perpetual.—II. There shall be reciprocal liberty of commerce and navigation between and amongst the respective subjects of the two high contracting parties in all, and several the territories and dominions of either. They may trade, travel, sojourn, or establish themselves in all and several the ports, cities, towns, countries, provinces, or places whatsoever belonging to each and either of the two high contracting parties, except and save in those from which all foreigners whatsoever are generally and positively excluded, the names of which places may be hereafter specified in a separate article of this treaty. Provided, however, that it be thoroughly understood, that any place belonging to either of the two high contracting parties, which may hereafter be opened to the commerce of the subjects of any other country, shall thereby be considered as equally opened, and upon correspondent terms, to the subjects of the other high contracting party, in the same manner as if it had been expressly stipulated by the present treaty. And his Britannic Majesty, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, do hereby bind and engage themselves not to grant any favour, privilege, or immunity, in matters of commerce and navigation, to the subjects of any other State, which shall not be also at the same time respectively extended to the subjects of the high contracting parties, gratuitously, if the concession in favour of that other State should have been gratuitous, and on giving, *quam pressus*, the same compensation or equivalent, in case the concession should have been conditional.—III. The subjects of the two Sovereigns respectively shall not pay in the ports, harbours, roads, cities, towns or places whatsoever, belonging to either of them, any greater duties, taxes, or imposts (under whatsoever names they may be designated or included) than those that are paid by the subjects of the most favoured nation; and the subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall enjoy within the dominions of the other, the same rights, privileges, liberties, favours, immunities,

or exemptions, in matters of commerce and navigation that are granted or may hereafter be granted to the subjects of the most favoured nation.—IV. His Britannic Majesty, and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, do stipulate and agree that there shall be a perfect reciprocity on the subject of the duties and imposts to be paid by the ships and vessels of the high contracting parties within the several ports, harbours, roads, and anchoring places belonging to each of them; to wit, that the ships and vessels of the subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall not pay any higher duties or imposts (under whatsoever name they be designated or implied) within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, than the ships and vessels belonging to the subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal shall be bound to pay within the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, and vice *versa*. And this agreement and stipulation shall particularly and expressly extend to the payment of the duties known by the name of Port Charges, Tonnage, and Anchorage Duties, which shall not in any case, or under any pretext, be greater for British ships and vessels within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, than for Portuguese ships and vessels within the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, and vice *versa*.—V. The two high contracting parties do also agree, that the same rates of bounties and drawbacks shall be established in their respective ports upon the exportation of goods and merchandizes, whether those goods or merchandizes be exported in British or in Portuguese ships and vessels, that is, that British ships and vessels shall enjoy the same favour in this respect within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, that may be shown to Portuguese ships and vessels within the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, and vice *versa*. The two high contracting parties do also covenant and agree, that goods and merchandizes coming respectively from the ports of either of them, shall pay the same duties, whether imported in British or in Portuguese ships or vessels, or otherwise, that an increase of duties may be imposed and exacted upon goods and merchandizes coming into the ports of the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal from those of his Britannic Majesty in British

ships, equivalent, and in exact proportion to any increase of duties that may hereafter be imposed upon goods and merchandizes coming into the ports of his Britannic Majesty from those of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, imported in Portuguese ships. And in order that this matter may be settled with due exactness, and that nothing may be left undetermined concerning it, it is agreed, that tables shall be drawn by each Government respectively, specifying the difference of duties to be paid on goods and merchandizes so imported in British or Portuguese ships and vessels; and the said tables (which shall be made applicable to all the ports within the respective dominions of each of the contracting parties) shall be declared and adjudged to form part of this present Treaty.—In order to avoid any differences or misunderstanding with respect to the regulations which may respectively constitute a British or Portuguese vessel, the high contracting parties agree in declaring, that all vessels built in the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, and owned, navigated, and registered according to the laws of Great Britain, shall be considered as British vessels. And that all ships or vessels built in the countries belonging to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, or in any of them, or ships taken by any of the ships or vessels of war belonging to the Portuguese Government, or any of the inhabitants of the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, having Commissions or Letters of Marque and Reprisal from the Government of Portugal, and condemned as lawful prize in any Court of Admiralty of the said Portuguese Government, and owned by the subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, or any of them, and whereof the master and three-fourths of the mariners, at least, are subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, shall be considered as Portuguese vessels.—VI. The mutual commerce and navigation of the subjects of Great Britain and Portugal respectively in the ports and seas of Asia, are expressly permitted to the same degree as they have heretofore been allowed by the two Crowns. And the commerce and navigation thus permitted, shall hereafter, and for ever, be placed on the footing of the commerce and navigation of the most favoured nation trading in the ports and

seas of Asia; that is, that neither of the high contracting parties shall grant any favour or privilege in matters of commerce and navigation, to the subjects of any other state trading within the ports and seas of Asia, which shall not be also granted *quam pro�pe*, on the same terms to the subjects of the other contracting party. His Britannic Majesty engages in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, not to make any regulation which may be prejudicial or inconvenient to the commerce and navigation of the subjects of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal within the ports and seas of Asia, to the extent which is or may hereafter be permitted to the most favoured nation. And his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal does also engage in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, not to make any regulations which may be prejudicial or inconvenient to the commerce and navigation of the subjects of his Britannic Majesty within the ports, seas and dominions opened to them by virtue of the present Treaty.—VII. The two high contracting parties have resolved with respect to the privileges to be enjoyed by the subjects of each of them within the territories or dominions of the other, that the most perfect reciprocity shall be observed on both sides. And the subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have a free and unquestionable right to travel, and to reside within the territories or dominions of the other, to occupy houses and warehouses, and to dispose of personal property of every sort and denomination, by sale, donation, exchange or testament, or in any other manner whatsoever, without any the smallest impediment or hindrance thereto. They shall not be compelled to pay any taxes or imposts under any pretext whatsoever, greater than those that are paid or may be paid by the native subjects of the Sovereign in whose dominions they may be resident. They shall be exempted from all compulsory military service whatsoever, whether by sea or land. Their dwelling-houses, warehouses, and all the parts and appurtenances thereof, whether for the purposes of commerce or of residence, shall be respected. They shall not be liable to any vexations visits and searches, nor shall any arbitrary examination or inspection of their books, papers, or accounts be made under colour of the supreme authority of the State. It is, however, to be understood, that in the

cases of treason, contraband trade, and other crimes, for the detection of which provision is made by the law of the land, that law shall be enforced, it being mutually declared that false and malicious accusations are not to be admitted as pretexts or excuses for vexatious visits and searches, or for examinations of commercial books, papers or accounts, which visits or examinations are never to take place, except under the sanction of the competent Magistrate, and in the presence of the Consul of the nation to which the accused party may belong, or of his deputy or representative.—VIII. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal engages in his own name, and in that of his heirs and successors, that the commerce of British subjects within his dominions shall not be restrained, interrupted, or otherwise affected by the operation of any monopoly, contract, or exclusive privileges of sale or purchase whatsoever, but that the subjects of Great Britain shall have free and unrestricted permission to buy and sell from and to whomsoever, and in whatever form or manner they may please, whether by wholesale or by retail, without being obliged to give any preference or favour in consequence of the said monopolies, contracts, or exclusive privileges of sale or purchase. And his Britannic Majesty does on his part engage to observe faithfully this principle thus recognized and laid down by the two High Contracting Parties.—But it is to be distinctly understood, that the present article is not to be interpreted as invalidating or affecting the exclusive right possessed by the Crown of Portugal within its own dominions to the farm for the sale of ivory, Brazil wood, urzela, diamonds, gold dust, gun-powder, and tobacco in the form of snuff: provided however, that should the above-mentioned articles, generally or separately, ever become articles of free commerce within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, the subjects of his Britannic Majesty shall be permitted to traffic in them as freely and on the same footing as those of the most favoured nation.—IX. His Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal have agreed and resolved, that each of the High Contracting Parties shall have the right to nominate and appoint Consuls General, Consuls, and Vice Consuls in all the ports of the dominions of the other Contracting Party, wherein they

are or may be necessary for the advancement of Commerce, and for the commercial interests of the trading subjects of either Crown. But it is expressly stipulated, that Consuls, of whatsoever class they may be, shall not be acknowledged nor received, nor permitted to act as such, unless duly qualified by their own Sovereign and approved of by the other Sovereign in whose dominions they are to be employed: Consuls of all classes within the dominions of each of the High Contracting Parties are respectively to be placed upon a footing of perfect reciprocity and equality; and being appointed solely for the purpose of facilitating and assisting in affairs of commerce and navigation, they are only to possess the privileges which belong to their station, and which are recognised and admitted by all Governments as necessary for the due fulfilment of their office and employment. They are in all cases, whether civil or criminal, to be entirely amenable to the laws of the country in which they may reside, and they are also to enjoy the full and entire protection of those laws so long as they conduct themselves in obedience thereto.—X. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, desiring to protect and facilitate the commerce of the subjects of Great Britain within his dominions as well as their relations of intercourse with his own subjects, is pleased to grant to them the privilege of nominating and having special Magistrates to act for them as Judges Conservator in those ports and cities of his dominions in which Tribunals and Courts of Justice are or may hereafter be established. These judges shall try and decide all causes brought before them by British subjects, in the same manner as formerly, and their authority and determination shall be respected; and the laws, decrees, and customs of Portugal respecting the jurisdiction of the Judge Conservator are declared to be recognised and renewed by the present Treaty. They shall be chosen by the plurality of British subjects residing in or trading at the port or place where the jurisdiction of the Judge Conservator is to be established; and the choice so made shall be transmitted to his Britannic Majesty's Ambassador, or Minister resident at the Court of Portugal, to be by him laid before his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in order to obtain his Royal Highness's consent, and confirmation, in

case of intercession, u Prince of the elect or effect Highn through bassade Royal this c jects, b cause t servanc laws b of Port dominio of which foreign acknowledge, a British stipulate vilege s Majesty State, w or to r Judge C ticle to Portugu priviledg ed to t within t manner by the tannic the Pri severally hours, i emption respecred them, an two Sov cularat h engages XII. H gent of his own t successor nic Maje and don troubled, count of have perf and leave service to either wi in their o

case of not obtaining which, the parties interested are to proceed to a new election, until the royal approbation of the Prince Regent be obtained. The removal of the Judge Conservator, in cases of neglect of duty or delinquency, is also to be effected by an application to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal through the channel of the British Ambassador, or Minister resident at his Royal Highness's Court. In return for this concession in favour of British subjects, his Britannic Majesty engages to cause the most strict and scrupulous observance and obedience to be paid to those laws by which the persons and property of Portuguese subjects residing within his dominions are secured and protected, and of which they (in common with all other foreigners) enjoy the benefit through the acknowledged equity of British Jurisprudence, and the singular excellence of the British Constitution. And it is further stipulated, that in case any favour or privilege should be granted by his Britannic Majesty to the subjects of any other State, which may seem to be analogous to, or to resemble the privilege of having Judge Conservators, granted by this article to British subjects residing in the Portuguese dominions, the same favour or privilege shall be considered as also granted to the subjects of Portugal residing within the British dominions, in the same manner as if it were expressly stipulated by the present Treaty.—XI. His Britannic Majesty and his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, agree severally to grant the same favours, honours, immunities, privileges, and exemptions from duties and imposts to their respective Ambassadors, Ministers, or accredited Agents at the Courts of each of them, and whatever favour either of the two Sovereigns shall grant in this particular at his own Court, the other Sovereign engages to grant the same at his Court.—XII. His Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal declares and engages, in his own name and in that of his heirs and successors, that the subjects of his Britannic Majesty residing within his territories and dominions shall not be disturbed, troubled, persecuted, or annoyed on account of their religion, but that they shall have perfect liberty of conscience therein, and leave to attend and celebrate divine service to the honour of Almighty God, either within their own private houses, or in their own particular churches and cha-

pels, which his Royal Highness does now and for ever graciously grant to them the permission of building and maintaining within his dominions: Provided however, that the said churches and chapels shall be built in such a manner as externally to resemble private dwelling houses; and also, that the use of bells be not permitted therein, for the purpose of publicly announcing the time of divine service: and it is further stipulated, that neither the subjects of Great Britain, nor any other foreigners of a different communion from the religion established in the dominions of Portugal, shall be persecuted or disquieted for conscience-sake, either in their persons or property, so long as they conduct themselves with order, decency, and morality, and in a manner conformable to the usages of the country, and to its Constitution in church and state; but if it should be proved that they preach or declaim publicly against the Catholic religion, or that they endeavour to make proselytes or converts, the parties so offending may, upon manifestation of their delinquency, be sent out of the country in which the offence shall have been committed; and those who behave in public with disrespect or impropriety towards the forms and ceremonies of the established Catholic religion, shall be amenable to the civil police, and may be punished by fine or by confinement within their own dwelling houses. And if the offence be so flagrant and so enormous as to disturb the public tranquillity, or endanger the safety of the institution of church and state (as established by law), the parties so offending may, on due proof of the fact, be sent out of the dominions of Portugal.—Liberty shall also be granted to bury the subjects of his Britannic Majesty who may die in the territories of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in convenient places to be appointed for that purpose; nor shall the funerals or sepulchres of the dead be disturbed in anywise, nor upon any account. In the same manner the subjects of Portugal shall enjoy within all the dominions of his Britannic Majesty, a perfect and unrestrained liberty of conscience in all matters of religion, agreeably to the system of toleration established therein. They may freely perform the exercises of their religion publicly or privately within their own dwelling houses, or in the chapels and places of worship appointed for that purpose, without any the smallest hindrance,

annoyance, or difficulty whatsoever, either now or hereafter.—**XIII.** It is agreed and covenanted by the high contracting parties, that packets shall be established for the purpose of furthering the public service of the two Courts, and of facilitating the commercial intercourse of their respective subjects. A convention shall be concluded forthwith on the basis of that which was signed at Rio de Janeiro on the 14th day of September, 1808, in order to settle the terms upon which the said packets are to be established, which convention shall be ratified at the same time with the present Treaty.—**XIV.** It is agreed and covenanted, that persons guilty of high treason, forgery, or other offences of a heinous nature, within the dominions of either of the high contracting parties, shall not be harboured nor receive protection in the dominions of the other. And that neither of the high contracting parties shall knowingly and wilfully receive into and entertain in their service persons, subjects of the other power deserting from the military service thereof, whether by sea or land; but that on the contrary they shall each respectively discharge any such person from their service upon being required: but it is agreed and declared, that neither of the high contracting parties shall grant to any other state any favour on the subject of persons deserting from the service of that state, which shall not be considered as granted also to the other high contracting party, in the same manner as if the said favour had been expressly stipulated by the present treaty. And it is further agreed, that in cases of apprentices or sailors deserting from vessels belonging to the subjects of either of the high contracting parties while within the ports of the other party, the Magistrates shall be bound to give effectual assistance for their apprehension, on due application to that effect being made by the Consul General, or Consul, or by his Deputy or Representative; and that no public body, civil or religious, shall have the power of protecting such deserters.—**XV.** All goods, merchandizes, and articles whatsoever of the produce, manufacture, industry or invention of the dominions and subjects of his Britannic Majesty, shall be admitted into all and singular the ports and dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal as well in Europe as in America, Africa,

and Asia, whether consigned to British or Portuguese subjects, on paying generally and solely duties to the amount of fifteen per cent. according to the value which shall be set upon them by a tariff or table of valuations, called in the Portuguese language *pauta*, the principal basis of which shall be the sworn invoice cost of the aforesaid goods, merchandizes and articles, taking also into consideration (as far as may be just or practicable) the current prices thereof in the country into which they are imported. This tariff or valuation shall be determined and settled by an equal number of British and Portuguese merchants of known integrity and honour, with the assistance on the part of the British merchants of his Britannic Majesty's Consul General, or Consul, and on the part of the Portuguese merchants with the assistance of the Superintendent, or Administrator General of the Customs, or of their respective Deputies. And the aforesaid tariff or table of valuations shall be made and promulgated in each of the ports belonging to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, in which there are or may be Custom-houses. It shall be concluded, and begin to have effect as soon as possible after the exchange of the ratifications of the present Treaty, and certainly within the space of three months reckoned from the date of that exchange. And it shall be revised and altered if necessary, from time to time, either in the whole or in part, whenever the subjects of his Britannic Majesty, resident within the dominions of his Royal Highness the Prince Regent of Portugal, shall make a requisition to that effect through the medium of his Britannic Majesty's Consul General or Consul, or whenever the trading and commercial subjects of Portugal shall make the same requisition on their own part. (*To be continued.*)

## COBBETT'S Parliamentary Debates:

The Fifteenth, Sixteenth, and Seventeenth Volumes of the above Work are in the Press, and will be published with all proper dispatch. All Communications will be carefully attended to; but it is particularly requested that they may be forwarded as early as possible.